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ACTIVISM, ARENAS AND ACCOUNTING IN CONFLICTS OVER TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
Prof. Ian Thomson, Heriot-Watt University, Scotland 
Dr. Colin Dey, University of Stirling, Scotland 
Dr. Shona Russell, University of St Andrews, Scotland 
 
Purpose: To provide theoretical and empirical insights into the effective use of external accounts by social 
activists in a range of conflict arenas in order to bring about change.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: This article presents a longitudinal case study of Action on Smoking and 
Health UK (ASH) and their use of external accounting and other activist practices during the period 1999 - 
2010. We explore these practices from the perspective of one organisation engaged in conflict arenas 
concerning the (un)acceptability of tobacco production, consumption and governance. We conduct our 
exploration based upon a dynamic conflict arena framework that attends to the range of external accounting 
and activist practices, tactical intentions and states of conflict used by ASH to confront the tobacco industry 
and bring about change in the governance of tobacco production and consumption.  
 
Findings: Our study identifies the use a diverse range of external accounts and other activist practices. These 
were used to initiate, perpetuate, escalate and seek resolution to tobacco-related conflicts across a number 
of arenas. This assemblage of external accounts and activist practices were used to confront, counter-act 
and to co-operate with actors engaged in tobacco-related conflicts. Our evidence suggests that the 
deployment of different types of external accounts by ASH was aligned to the context of the particular 
conflict arena involved, and was influenced by the strategy and engagement tactics of the activists and other 
actors, as well as power dynamics and acceptability of the governance regime in the contested arena. Whilst 
ASH used different external accounts in specific episodes of activism, these individual accounts also 
contributed to an emerging holistic account of the unacceptable consequences of tobacco production, 
consumption and governance. 
 
Originality/value: This study provides theoretical and empirical insights into how external accounting can 
contribute to the problematisation and development of social and environmental change agendas. The 
conceptual framework developed in this paper creates new visibilities and possibilities for developing 
external accounting practices and in researching this fast-developing area of social and environmental 
accounting.   
 
Keywords: external accounting, transformation, governmentality, tobacco, activism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The most encouraging event of the last month was a vitriolic attack on ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) 
by the retiring chairman of British American Tobacco. He spoke with loathing of the “narrowly based, 
vociferous anti-tobacco activists” trying to criminalise its customers, without mentioning that BAT killed 7.5 
million of them in the last decade. It showed just how painful a pressure group’s sting can be. 
Malcolm Dean, The Guardian, 5 May 2004  
 
Anti-tobacco activism has been amongst the most effective social movements in the last thirty years. Since 
publication of a causal link between smoking and lung cancer in 1950, this social movement has been 
influential in bringing about radical changes in policy, individual smoking behaviour and culture (Berridge & 
Loughlin 2005; Berridge, 2007; Mamudu et al., 2011). Recent examples of change include bans on smoking in 
public places in the UK and several other countries, and the introduction of plain packaging for tobacco 
products in Australia.  The movement has sought to de-normalise the production and consumption of a 
product that previously epitomised progress, sophistication and modernity, and to call into question 
governance regimes concerning tobacco.  
 
Tobacco, smoking, and multi-national tobacco companies have been the subject of much academic study, 
spanning issues such as: individual freedoms (Bell et al., 2010); corporate social responsibility of the tobacco 
industry (Moerman and van der Laan, 2005; Palazzo & Richter, 2005; Wiist, 2006); and tobacco control 
(Trochim et al., 2003), with the latter also being examined in the context of the history of public health 
science and policy (Berridge 1999, 2003, 2007). Within this body of public health research, activism and use 
of the media and advertising have been identified as significant issues (Berridge, 2007; Berridge & Loughlin, 
2005; Pennock, 2008; Street, 2004). In this paper, we extend this work with specific reference to external 
accounting1 by developing conceptual and empirical insights into the role of external accounts within 
conflict arenas surrounding tobacco control.   
 
External accounts are produced by, or on behalf of, individuals who are beyond, or ‘outside’, the control of 
the entity that is the subject of the account. Typically, external accounts will originate from less powerful 
social groups, in order to justify some form of corrective intervention. Mirroring the abilities of dominant 
forms of accounting, external accounts create alternative representations of organisational conduct and 
construct and communicate new visibilities and knowledge of existing situations, in order to oppose and 
change something regarded as socially and environmentally harmful or undesirable. By problematising 
organisational conduct from the perspective of oppressed social groups and/or ecological systems, external 
accounts can problematise and “make ‘thinkable’ and ‘governable’ those issues currently regarded as 
‘unthinkable’ and ‘ungovernable’ by those in power” (Dey et al., 2010, p.64).  
 
Furthermore, external accounts may form part of activist practices intended to challenge and de-legitimate 
power relations in order to mobilise change agendas in social movements. These external accounts are 
therefore embedded within struggles for power, resources and the ability to govern. The use by civil society 
of external accounting processes and practices has grown in importance in the social accounting literature 
(Gallhofer et al., 2006; Shenkin & Coulson, 2007; Spence, 2007, 2009), and resonates with the critical 
accounting community, specifically those seeking transformative change (see, for example, Cooper et al., 
2005; Everett, 2004). Many activist organisations have sought to make visible and delegitimise the social and 
environmental impacts of corporations and governments as part of their campaigns for change (Crossley, 
2003). Activist and campaigning groups within civil society use external accounting practices to problematise 
the social and ecological acceptability and legitimacy of the actions of others and create new forms of 
knowledge and fields of visibility of the actions of institutions. From a social movement perspective, external 
accounting may therefore be viewed as a form of symbolic activism that can challenge and disrupt the target 
entity’s reputation, power and legitimacy (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 2013).  External accounting 
can also be viewed as an adaptable form of engagement amongst a range of actors within conflict arenas 
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(Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008).  We suggest that focusing on external accounting in social movement 
campaigns, rather than those produced by profit-seeking corporations, provides a rich empirical site in which 
to consider accounting’s contribution to social and environmental change agendas  (Bebbington & Thomson 
2007).   
 
We develop the exploration of the links between external accounting and social activism using a longitudinal 
analysis of Action on Smoking and Health UK (ASH hereafter) in the period 1999 - 2010. ASH is a public 
health charity that works to eliminate the harm caused by tobacco in a diverse range of conflict arenas. ASH 
is generally regarded as a highly effective activist organisation that makes extensive use of a diverse 
assemblage of practices (including external accounting) to problematise aspects of tobacco production, 
consumption, and governance (Mamudu et al., 2011). We examine a series of external accounts produced by 
ASH as part of campaigns that sought to problematise and transform regimes of tobacco control. This 
longitudinal case study provides empirical evidence to develop a conceptual typology of external accounts 
developed by Dey et al. (2012), and to theoretically extend this typology by integrating insights from 
research into social activism.   
 
The longitudinal case study provides insights into the emergence and evolution of ASH’s campaigns that 
sought to holistically and comprehensively de-normalise tobacco across various conflict arenas. Within these 
campaigns, external accounts provided evidence of the harm of tobacco, to be disseminated amongst a 
wider audience of actors.  External accounts contributed significantly to ASH’s efforts to de-normalise and 
de-legitimate all aspects of tobacco production, consumption and governance. ASH sought to target 
numerous organisations and aspects across the whole tobacco life cycle, and external accounts (in multiple 
forms) were used to communicate the evidence on which these campaigns were built. These accounts were 
also a major part of their efforts to engage many stakeholders and to facilitate co-operation and support of 
ASH’s vision. ASH’s external accounts may be interpreted as a reaction to problematic actions or knowledge 
claims by those supporting tobacco; as an effort to disseminate new evidence to further problematise 
tobacco production and consumption; or to suggest possible solutions to these risks that could involve 
changes in governance, technology, organisational practices and individual smoking practices. Our findings 
therefore provide further insights into how accounting “for the other, by the other” (Dey et al., 2010, p.64) 
can manifest itself in praxis. Finally, in understanding the dynamics of conflict arenas and contribution of 
external accounting provides important insights into the potential of external accounting within any process 
of social change, particularly from the perspective of societal groups that lack power.  
 
The article is structured as follows: first, we review prior research in this field and present a conceptual 
dynamic conflict framework. Second, we outline our research methods and explain our rationale for 
selecting ASH. Third, we present our findings for our study of ASH’s external accounting and activism 
assemblages. These findings are set out in two stages, beginning with a broad analysis of the scope and 
patterns of external accounting and activism adopted by ASH in a range of tobacco-related conflict arenas 
during the period 1999-2010. This is followed by an analysis of the key dynamics of a specific arena - still 
unresolved - associated with the conflict between ASH and British American Tobacco (BAT), concerning the 
latter’s social responsibility and sustainability claims. Finally we summarise our findings, discuss the study’s 
contributions; and outline some areas of further research.  
2. External Accounting and Social Activism within Conflict Arenas 
 
The concept of conflict arenas has been used to analyse a number of social and environmental concerns (for 
example, Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; Lowi, 1964; Rucht, 1990; Dey & 
Russell, 2014). The conflict arena is a metaphor to describe the symbolic location of political engagements 
surrounding a specific issue of concern that affects and is affected by a range of different actors. An arena is 
not a predictive model, but seeks to represent, explain and make sense of complex decision making 
processes (Renn, 1992). Analysis of a conflict arena attempts to represent the key actors involved, their 
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patterns of interaction, communication and the processes that affect the collective outcome (if any). It is 
assumed that the assemblage of engagement practices by actors will differ and be shaped by different 
tactical intentions, that are in turn contingent on the collective dynamics of the conflict resolution process. 
These practices are also affected by the level of resources, such as money, power, social influence, value, 
reputation, knowledge and evidence, possessed by each actor. Whilst resource accumulation may be the 
ultimate goal of an actor, arena engagements are normally evaluated by actors’ perceptions of their 
influence on decisions made (Renn, 1992).  
 
A conflict arena further assumes that different actors are involved in a struggle to influence the outcome of 
a collective decision process in accordance with their values and beliefs. Georgakopoulus and Thomson 
(2008) used a single conflict arena model to evaluate the range of engagement activities, including a range 
of accounting practices, that informed the social and environmental risk discourse and the governance of 
salmon farming in Scotland. Their findings identified the existence of multiple accounts from different arena 
actors, heterogeneous engagement activities, reflexive engagement dynamics and the co-evolution of the 
different accounting practices with tactical intent in a specific conflict arena.  
 
Previous research in the field of external accounting has largely framed the engagement as a two-actor 
conflict, whereas our dynamic conflict arena framework extends this to more complex relations amongst 
many actors, which includes coalitions, counter-action and co-operation as well as confrontation (Kneip, 
2013). This extension from a simple antagonist-protagonist conflict allows greater insights and nuances to 
be drawn on the contribution of external accounts within an assemblage of activist practices to mobilise 
social and environmental change. Unfortunately, issues that are subject to change agendas, such as poverty, 
social injustice, environmental destruction, starvation and disease are not resolvable in a single conflict 
arena and unlikely to solely involve two actors. Instead, those activists seeking some change, even on a 
single issue, often engage in a variety of different conflict arenas simultaneously over periods of time, 
particularly when the cause of the problematic behaviour is related to the actions of powerful groups in 
society.  
 
In this paper, we seek to extend Georgakopoulus and Thomson’s (2008) use of a single conflict arena by 
integrating it with a more considered evaluation of engagement activities, actors intentions, the states of an 
evolving conflict, the  interaction and merging of different conflict arenas and strategic outcomes (see also 
Thomson & Georgakopoulos, 2012; Power, 2004; Beck & Wilms, 2004). This extension allows the evaluation 
of evolving assemblages of engagement activities associated with a long term, persistent activism 
campaigns that involves reflexive engagements amongst a range of actors across various conflict arenas. 
Specifically, we develop a conceptual framework that integrates  (i) a typology of external accounting and 
activist practices (Dey et al., 2012); (ii) a typology of the main tactical intentions of social activism (Kneip, 
2013) and; (iii) Beck and Wilms’s (2004) risk conflict dynamics (see also Power, 2004), in order to 
differentiate the various states and outcomes within conflict arenas. The key elements of each of these 
elements are shown in Table 1 below and summarised in the remainder of this section. 
  
Table 1: Summary of key dimensions within conflict arenas 
 
A Typology of External Accounts and Activist Practices 
Some preliminary empirical insights on external accounting’s contribution to social and environmental 
change have already emerged within the social accounting literature (see, for example, Georgakopoulos & 
Thomson, 2008; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009; Rodrigue, 2014). These studies suggest that multiple forms of 
external accounts may be used within conflict arenas; and specific assemblages of external accounts and 
activist practices may be deployed depending on the state of the engagement between actors in the conflict 
arena.  
 
Based on insights emerging from such studies, Dey et al (2012) suggest that external accounting techniques 
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can be purposively changed in order to engage more effectively with prevailing governance regimes. They 
also argue that greater attention should be paid to alignment of such external accounts and activist 
practices, and also to associated conceptions of the issues being problematised (visbility), the entity that was 
responsible for the problematised issue (entity) and the outcome sought (transformation). Drawing on 
differences in the underlying intentions, values and rationalities of those producing the accounts, Dey et al. 
(2012) identify four broad types of external account: systematic, partisan, contra-governing, and dialogic.  
These are outlined in Table 2 below2: 
 
Table 2: A typology of external accounting (adapted from Dey et al., 2012) 
 
Systematic external accounts challenge the acceptability of aspects of the target organisation’s conduct. This 
is typically undertaken by systematically providing new knowledge, such as evidence of the impacts or 
consequences of that conduct. At its simplest, for example, this type of external accounting may consist of 
information on plant emissions provided to environmental regulators, or evidence of safety risks of a 
product sent to appropriate regulatory authorities.  
 
By contrast, partisan external accounts are intended to transform specific technologies, organisational 
conduct or elements of the existing governance regime that are deemed unacceptable by the actor 
producing the external account. These types of external accounts generally involve a deliberate attempt to 
directly confront, antagonise and de-legitimate elements within the existing governance regimes, rather 
than focusing on one organisation’s conduct. Like systematic external accounting, partisan external accounts 
may contain details of costs, statistics and evidence of harm or potential harm. However, partisan external 
accounts produced by campaign groups typically blend together evidence of harm with emotional narratives 
(often as personal case studies) that dramatise the harm done to individuals, and question the moral and 
ethical nature of institutional or organisational conduct. From this perspective, partisan external accounts 
represent a confrontational form of symbolic activism where the primary goal may be to cause reputational 
damage and/or more material forms of damage to the target entity, such as encouraging shareholders to 
disinvest in corporations, consumers to boycott products and services, or regulators to further expand their 
power to control the target entity.  
 
While systematic and partisan external accounts focus on the unacceptable consequences of specific aspects 
of an organisation’s conduct or technologies of governing, contra-governing external accounts focus 
primarily on seeking to transform the existing governance regime. At this level, the focus is therefore no 
longer an individual organisation or field-level campaign issue. Rather, contra-governing external accounts 
seek to critique the fundamental knowledge base (ideology) of those in power, with the intention of 
replacing it with the knowledge base (ideology) of the problematising accountants.  
 
Rather than articulating a single or universal emancipatory interest, dialogic accounts are starting points for 
the recognition and inclusion of the diversity of interests amongst actors in conflict arenas. These interests 
typically include individuals and groups working both within as well as outside prevailing governance 
regimes. Dialogic engagement emphasises the need for multiple accounts – including a variety of systematic, 
partisan and contra-governing external accounts, as well as organisation-centred accounts - that can 
authentically reconstruct this diversity of interests. The use of external accounts is simply a starting point for 
surfacing conflicts and searching for possible areas of cooperation. The overall objective of dialogic 
engagement is to work with all parties within an ongoing, emergent process to synthesise a new form of 
governing. 
 
Dey et al.’s (2012) typology provides a useful initial categorisation of what broad types of external accounts 
may be available to activists. However, it does not provide any immediate insights to the more tactical issues 
of when or how these types of external accounts might be deployed as part of assemblages of activist 
practices within any given conflict arena and how external accounting may evolve over time. For example, 
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O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer’s (2009) study of the interaction between corporations and activists surrounding the 
banking industry’s Equator Principles illustrates how activist usage of external accounts evolved over the 
course of an engagement. Initially forms of partisan external accounts were used as symbolic ‘ammunition’ 
intended to ‘name and shame’ individual banks as part of a broader advocacy-based media-driven campaign, 
use of external accounts changed as the conflict towards a more conciliatory stage. Here, more systematic 
and less confrontational external accounts were used as part of a process of negotiation and dialogue with 
the banking industry around the Equator Principles as substantive field-level reforms.  
 
In addition, Dey et al.’s (2012) typology could be used to categorise activist practices. For example, lobbying 
by activist groups could be used in a systematic, partisan, contra-governmental or dialogic fashion. Likewise, 
a range of direct actions (including occupations, picketing, media campaigns, demonstrations, boycotts and 
buycotts) can be seen to be adaptable to different strategic outcomes. In our dynamic conflict arena 
framework, we consider that activist practices need to be evaluated in terms of the new visibilities they 
create in the arena, the entity they seek to transform and the level of transformation sought. Although 
beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest it is as important to evaluate the effectiveness and 
transformative potential of activism practices, as it is to evaluate external accounting.   
 
External Accounts and Activist Tactical Intentions 
To develop our conceptual framework further, we may turn to the critical management and organisation 
studies literatures, where prior studies have also explored discursive struggles between corporations and 
activists (see, for example, Joutsenvirta, 2011; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Kneip, 2013). These studies 
suggest that engagements surrounding discursive struggles can be divided into stages, which themselves 
correspond to distinct tactical intentions on the part of those activists involved. Drawing on an institutional 
theory perspective of activist-firm conflict, Den Hond and de Bakker (2007) argue that, before new forms of 
participation can be institutionalised, there remains the need for existing institutions to be de-legitimised 
and deinstitutionalised. Kneip (2013) builds on this argument to suggest that de-institutionalising and re-
institutionalising stages of an engagement correspond to specific confrontation (deinstitutionalising) and co-
operative (reinstitutionalising) tactical intentions. Kneip also identifies the existence of an additional, 
intermediate stage, which she refers to as counteraction. This is defined as:  
 
“a mixture between cooperation and confrontation (often concealing confrontation behind a 
cooperative surface). The defining characteristic of counteraction is a subtle reframing of the 
counterpart’s behaviour in terms of the other party’s own interpretation. In this way, an actor makes 
use of its opponent’s strategy in order to further develop its own repertoire.” (Kneip, 2013, p. 192).  
 
Kneip’s analysis of these three tactical stages also encompasses an exploration of the types of discursive 
tactics used by social movements (as well as corporations) at each stage, and discusses some of the typical 
scenarios in which discursive struggles are played out. Table 3 below represents an attempt to map Dey et 
al.’s (2012) different types of external account against the three tactical stages identified by Kneip (2013). 
While Kneip focuses only on firm-level discursive contests, we seek to develop her analysis across all four 
types of external account that concern conflict arenas involving various actors. 
 
Table 3: Mapping types of external accounts to activist tactical intentions 
 
Mapping Dey et al.’s (2012) typology of external account against Kneip’s (2013) three tactical stages of 
activism reveals a number of interesting insights concerning the role of external accounts within activist 
engagement repertoires. Whilst O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer’s (2009) tentative distinction between partisan 
accounts as a means to initiate conflict, and systematic accounts as a means to seek more cooperation is 
supported, both systematic and partisan external accounts may be regarded as a useful tactic of counter-
action. Here, partisan external accounts may also be further subdivided into specific rhetorical forms, such 
as ironic deconstruction (see, for example, Spence, 2009, who explores the use of and parody in ‘adbusting’) 
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and immanent critique (such as the re-presenting of corporate CSR as ‘greenwash’) (Gallhofer & Haslam, 
2003, Dey, 2007). Systematic accounts may also be divided into different sub-types, including broader 
monitoring of the target organisation’s activities, as well as more specific breach reporting. 
 
While systematic, partisan and contra-governing accounts may all be regarded as potentially effective forms 
of counteraction, prior studies also suggest that systematic accounts are not effective as a means to initiate 
conflict (Kneip, 2013; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). Instead, the dramatising ability of more partisan forms of 
activism becomes indispensable to communicate the grievances that campaigners pursue when initiating 
conflict. A further limitation with systematic external accounts is their general focus on organisation-level 
conduct or intentions (Dey et al., 2012). By contrast, partisan accounts often include broader issue or 
industry-level actions directed at regulation or other similar reforms. These actions may also be seen as 
important in avoiding the risk of organisational capture or re-legitimation (see, for example, Cooper et al., 
2005).  
 
A significant feature of contra-governing accounts is the way in which they may draw upon scientific 
discourse for their legitimacy, rather than depending on more context-specific emotional narratives. In this 
scenario, counteraction is possible using expert science (see, for example, Collison et al., 2007, 2010 within 
the social accounting literature). Table 3 also highlights the potential for dialogic accounts to present a 
unique opportunity for ‘genuine’ democratic and participative cooperation that is intended to be resistant to 
capture (Burchell & Cook, 2013). However, a significant degree of structural change is a prerequisite rather 
than simply a desired outcome of such engagement (Dey et al., 2012). Dialogic engagements thus remain 
largely confined to thought experiments and conceptual discussion within the accounting literature (see, for 
example, Thomson & Bebbington, 2005; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2013). 
 
Our interest here is not to prescribe any of Dey et al.’s (2012) types of external accounts as an ideal-type, but 
rather to explore the role of each of the different approaches to external accounting within and amongst the 
type of conflict arenas that characterize contemporary struggles between social movements, dominant 
institutions, rule-enforcers, political institutions and the general public. The next section will introduce the 
conceptualisation of the states and dynamics of conflict arenas. 
 
External Accounting & Arena Conflicts 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) argue that the arena concept provides a useful platform to examine 
how accounting and activism practices interact in conflict arenas. Accounting in often a key practice for 
governance regime that relates to conflict arenas. For example, rule enforcers may rely on a range of 
accounting practices in order to monitor compliance, and this may give power and legitimacy to external 
accounting interventions in an arena (Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008). In any conflict arena, arena actors 
(see Table 1) engage in different ways to affect the outcome (Joutsenvirta, 2011; den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007; Kneip, 2013; Beck & Wilms, 2004; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2010, Power, 2004). Evidence is a critical 
resource in arena engagements (Renn, 1992) that involves preparing and disseminating accounts amongst 
arena participants.  
 
In seeking to understand the dynamics of conflict situations, the existence of key states in an emerging 
conflict have been identified (Beck & Wilms, 2004; Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2012; Power, 2004). It is 
assumed that prior to any conflict emerging, there is a temporary equilibrium state where the governance 
regimes and associated mechanisms of accounting and accountability are generally regarded sufficient to 
manage the socially acceptable risks or harm. Within this state, there is a broad consensus on the 
acceptability of the consequences of these practises by most arena actors and therefore there is a lack of 
conflict.  
 
When this consensus is disrupted, the ensuing conflict can be seen to exhibit five possible main conflict 
states: initiation, resolution, denial, perpetuation and escalation. Any specific conflict does not need to 
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involve all five states, or go through these states in the order they are presented. For example, a conflict 
could be initiated and resolved without going through the perpetuation or escalation states. Similarly, a 
conflict could almost indefinitely circle round the denial or perpetuation states without any desire to 
escalate or prospects of resolution. We now present a brief overview of the key states of a conflict arena 
with an emphasis on its relevance to the activist practices and engagements, including the use of external 
accounting.   
 
The conflict initiation state involves the decision by any actor to purposively disrupt the temporary 
equilibrium. This normally involves confronting at least one other actor in the arena as to the acceptability 
or legitimacy of their actions or intentions. Underpinning engagements in this state is a discourse of harm 
intended to delegitimate something associated with the arena. Conflict initiation can be triggered by an 
array of different factors, such as new knowledge about existing risks/harm, the emergence of new harm 
discourses, accidents or events, changes in external circumstances or developments in other conflict arenas.  
 
Prior research suggests that external accounts can be used to initiate conflicts as a reaction to events 
associated with a past conflict (see, for example, Cooper et al. 2005; Owen and Harte, 1987; Solomon and 
Thomson, 2009). Other activist practices could also be used to initiate a conflict, for example the occupation 
of the Brent Spar oil platform by Greenpeace, television documentaries on factory farming, social media 
activism, and the Arab Spring. The nature of the conflict initiation practices may be contingent on a number 
of factors, including the nature of the problematic actions or intentions; intended audience in the arena 
(other activists, political institutions, rule enforcers, media, general public); the tactical intention 
(confrontation, counter-action, cooperation); and desired outcomes.   
 
It is also likely that conflict initiation practices have multiple tactical intentions. For example, an external 
account that provides evidence of a corporate breach of regulation could be intended to confront the 
corporation, the rule enforcer, other corporations adopting similar practices; and to initiate co-operation 
with other activists, the media or communities adversely affected by these corporate actions or intentions.  
Conflict initiation practices can play an important role in constructing the conflict arena and in mobilising 
action from arena actors. It is likely that an assemblage of practices will be deployed to initiate a conflict and 
to engage with all relevant actors, to make use of the most appropriate communication media and tailor the 
desired messages to different actors. This could involve a breach report delivered to rule enforcers, a 
scientific document sent to political institutions, a video posted on Youtube, press releases, social media 
messages, launching of a petition, some form of direct action and/or media stunts. 
 
It is possible for actors to collectively arrive at a conflict resolution state at any time, without necessarily 
going through other conflict states. For example, actors associated with the problematic behaviour framed 
in the conflict initiation state may accept responsibility and are either appropriately sanctioned through the 
existing regulatory regime, compensate or mitigate the harm caused, or volunteer to stop the problematic 
behaviour. However, some conflict arenas may be so contested, with polarised views on all sides, that it is 
not possible to identify how these conflicts could be resolved. This response action could lead to the re-
establishment of temporary equilibrium in the arena. This outcome is largely contingent on all actors 
accepting the acceptability of the governance. However, if the source of the problem lies outside the 
conflict arena, then it is unlikely that the conflict initiators or perpetuators would regard this as a permanent 
solution to the conflict.  
 
Third, any actor could engage in a conflict denial state to refute the legitimacy of discourse at the conflict 
initiation state. How these actors choose to engage is expected to vary and is likely to shaped by the 
assemblage of practices used to initiate the conflict and the level of perceived threats to actors in the 
conflict arena. For example, if the conflict was initiated through lobbying of political institutions to reform 
laws or regulations, then other actors could also engage in lobbying these same institutions. The greater the 
perceived threat to their legitimacy then the more active their denial engagements will be. These denial 
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engagements will be targeted at the elements of the conflict initiation perceived to be the most de-
legitimating.  
 
Conflict denial engagements can be undertaken directly by the ‘confronted’ actor, indirectly by other actors 
or in a coalition with actors in order to respond collectively to this conflict initiation. These engagements 
typically reflect tactical intentions that are themselves confrontational, by displaying defiance in the face of 
those initiating the conflict (Kneip, 2013). It is assumed that actors denying the conflict perceive an 
advantage in the status quo and seek to re-legitimate their actions within existing arena governance 
regimes. Other actors who also perceive an advantage in status quo are likely allies in conflict denial 
engagements, and this could lead to official, collective denial by political institutions and rule-enforcers of 
the legitimacy of conflict initiation engagements. Conflict denial engagements are often underpinned by a 
discourse of compliance: by complying with existing regulations, there is no harm and therefore no 
legitimate basis for the conflict. Following these conflict denial engagements, it is possible for those actors 
that initiated the conflict to stop their engagements, and a period of temporary equilibrium may emerge in 
the arena.   
  
Fourth, the conflict initiating actor(s) or other arena actors could respond to conflict denial engagements 
with a new assemblage of actions to ‘deny the denial’, resulting in a conflict perpetuation state. Conflict 
perpetuation engagements will be shaped by the perceived strengths (or weaknesses) of the re-legitimating 
discourse to the desired outcomes of actors or groups of actors. It is reasonable to assume that conflict 
perpetuation engagements will be targeted at elements of the conflict denial engagements perceived to be 
the most re-legitimating. Conflict perpetuation engagements could include the addition of more (or new) 
evidence into the arena; the use of more or different channels of engagement; and the adoption of other 
practices that are considered most appropriate to respond this re-legitimating discourse and to strengthen 
the impact of their de-legitimating discourse and actions in the conflict arena. The conflict perpetuation 
state is likely to involve a complex sequence of de- (and re-) legitimating engagements amongst all actors as 
they confront, counter-act or co-operate with each other.  
 
This sequence of engagements may use various assemblages of activist practices (including external 
accounts) until some form of resolution is reached, or an actor (or group of actors) decides to escalate the 
conflict. This state of conflict escalation may involve challenging the credibility of, or to problematise, the 
arena governance regime and the credibility of rule enforcers and political institutions. Conflict escalation 
engagements require de-legitimation of a coalition of powerful political and regulatory institutions as well 
as the actors directly related to the problematic risks/harms. Attempts to escalate the conflict could further 
entrench those actors denying and perpetuating the contested risks and harm. This could lead rule-
enforcers and political institutions to defend problematic actions/intentions in order to maintain their 
position of power in this and other arenas. Partisan or contra-governing conflict escalation engagements 
can lead to larger coalitions of actors opposing change, who share a common interest in maintaining the 
governance regime, even though they had no direct involvement in the original conflict.  
 
Conflict escalation may involve merging the initial conflict arena with another; or projecting or importing a 
discourse of harm from a specific arena into another. In these cases, the epicentre of the conflict arena 
shifts from a risk or harm identified in the conflict initiation state to the governing regime and changes the 
de-legitimating target to those governing the risks/harm (Power, 2004). For example, Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson (2008) report how a conflict over the location of a single salmon farm was escalated by linking it to 
conflicts over global marine ecosystems, via the impact of salmon food production and extinction threats for 
wild Atlantic salmon. Thus, projecting or importing discourses from other arenas in the conflict escalation 
state can result in conjoining various – previously separate – arenas. Further, conflict escalation leads to a 
larger coalition of actors with a common interest in changing the governance regime, but with no direct 
interest in the original conflict (Power, 2004; Beck & Wilms, 2004).   
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Activist-firm conflict studies suggest that social campaign organisations are likely at any point in time to be 
engaged in multiple conflict arenas (Beck & Wilms, 2004; Crossley, 2003; Dean, 1999, 2007). Such 
organisations are thus able to learn from individual engagement episodes and gain expertise in initiating, 
perpetuating, escalating and resolving conflicts. Similarly, political institutions, rule enforcers and 
corporations are likely to engage in many conflicts, responding to a series of legitimacy threats from many 
different sources, and thus able to gain experience in denying, perpetuating, escalating and resolving 
conflicts. Over time actors repeatedly involved in different conflict arenas will develop their particular 
assemblage of conflict engagement practices and strategies that they believe increase their prospects of 
success as well as gaining knowledge of the likely engagement practices and strategies of other actors, 
particular their ‘regular’ antagonists. For example, the engagement of key actors in multiple conflict arenas 
allows a single activist practice, including external accounts, to be deployed in multiple arenas. Just as 
accounting facilitates governance at a distance (Miller & O’Leary, 1993; Hoskin & Macve, 1994), external 
accounting facilitates resistance, conflict and counter-action at a distance. Evidence of harm gathered and 
deployed through external accounts in a conflict arena concerning problematic marketing by one company 
in one country can be redeployed in other conflict arenas such as that concerning marketing by that same 
company in other countries or over social responsibility claims of a global industry. It is also the case that 
evidence to counter claims of harm made by activists in one arena can also be redeployed in many other 
conflicts through the use of external accounts.  
 
Past analysis of external accounts has largely focussed on a single conflict arena and ignored the impact (and 
learning) of engagements in past and parallel conflicts, including resolutions amongst all arena actors. 
Drawing on the conceptual framework presented above, we suggest that within complex, reflexive multi-
actor arenas, a range of different activist practices will be deployed at different states of the conflict 
depending on the tactical and strategic intent of the activists and in response to engagements with others in 
the arena. This dynamic conflict arena framework is proposed as a heuristic, rather than normative model, 
that informs our exploration of the roles and effectiveness of external accounts in social activism campaigns, 
particularly concerning how external accounts are used to engage in order to bring about change over a 
sustained period of time. The following section outlines the research methods adopted.   
 
 
3. Research Methods   
 
As discussed earlier, the intention of this paper is to explore the use of external accounting from the 
perspective of one activist organisation involved in sustained campaigns across different conflict arenas over 
a long period of time. We did not intend to undertake a detailed analysis of all conflict engagements by the 
activist organisation, but sought to provide an empirical overview into the scope and assemblages of 
campaigning practices deployed across different arenas.   
 
Given our research objectives and analytical framework, the most appropriate research method was a case 
study (Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995). A single case study approach allows us to document and analyse in greater 
depth the patterns and scope of external accounting and activism. Our approach is necessarily context-
specific, and hence no generaliseable conclusions are intended to be drawn from what follows. 
Nevertheless, we do believe that our study may be of wider relevance to the study of the role of accounting 
in the context of broader social and environmental change agendas. 
 
The first stage in this research was the selection of the case organisation. This selection was informed by a 
number of criteria, which included: a highly contested issue of concern; evidence of change arising from a 
long term programme of activism; an organisation recognised by other institutions as an effective campaign 
organisation; the existence of high profile powerful antagonists; evidence of use of external accounting; and 
access to documentary archives. Based on these criteria, we shortlisted five activist organisations: ASH, 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, OXFAM and WWF and conducted an initial review of websites and 
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related research literature. All of these organisations met our basic criteria, but ASH was judged the most 
suitable for our study as it was a single issue campaigner with evidence of success in the tobacco control 
arena (Berridge 2007; Berridge & Loughlin 2005; Mamudu et al., 2011; Palazzo & Richter, 2005; Pennock, 
2008; Wiist, 2007); external recognition of its campaign effectiveness3; use of external accounts accounts 
(see, for example, ASH 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2010); and a comprehensive library of its 
publications going back over many years was publicly accessible via its website.  
 
ASH was established in 1971 by the UK Royal College of Physicians as a campaigning public health charity to 
eliminate the harm caused by tobacco. ASH is part of a global network of tobacco control movement 
comprising other ASH organisations in the United States of America and Australia and other health groups 
and charities. ASH is funded from three main sources: medical charities that share their concern (including 
the British Heart Foundation (BHF) and Cancer Research UK), government funding (including the UK 
Department of Health, Welsh Regional Assembly and Local Authorities) and income from the public as 
donations, subscriptions and income generated from activities. In 2010, ASH’s income was £0.95m and the 
organisation employed ten staff.  
 
ASH’s website states that it seeks to be innovative and agenda-setting, whilst ensuring that its policies are 
evidence based. ASH’s activism is built round two interrelated strategies:  
 
‘Information and networking: To develop opinion and awareness about the “tobacco epidemic” 
Advocacy and campaigning: To press for policy measures that will reduce the burden of addiction, 
disease and premature death attributable to tobacco.’ 
ASH, ‘About Us’ webpage4 
 
Since its inception, ASH developed a range of advocacy and campaigning expertise, in particular, through the 
use of the mainstream media to amplify general awareness of smoking related issues (Berridge, 2007, p. 
1311). Their approach to activism is illustrated in the following quote from a previous Director of ASH: 
 
“It seemed to me when I came into ASH that here was a pressure campaign that was ripe. It hadn’t 
been properly used. You had your villain. You had your St George and the dragon scenario, you had 
your growing ecology bandwagon, growing interest in consumerism. It seemed there were a lot of 
prospects of making something out of it.”    
Mike Daube, Director of ASH (c.1975-75) 5 
 
ASH is part of a global network of tobacco control movement comprising other ASH organisations in the 
United States of America and Australia and other health groups and charities. ASH’s opponents in tobacco 
control arenas include multinational tobacco corporations, often collectively referred to as ‘Big Tobacco’, a 
somewhat pejorative term used to describe companies including British American Tobacco (BAT hereafter), 
Imperial Tobacco, Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds. In addition, ASH’s campaigns also confront a range of other 
actors in tobacco control arenas (see Table 2).  
 
Data gathering & analysis 
Following our initial survey of ASH’s website, we undertook a multi-stage process to gather documents from 
the organisation’s website. First, we analysed ASH’s Annual Reviews6 to identify the campaigns, activities, 
successes and failures that occurred in this period and ASH’s plans for the future. Second, we used the 
analysis of the annual reports to search for specific documents referred to, or for any related details 
disclosed on the website7. Where there were claims of successful campaigns, including changes in 
legislation, regulation, codes and/or international protocols, we searched for external sources to verify these 
claims. In most cases, the ASH website or reports contained hyperlinks to these external sources. This 
targeted search for information drawn from each Annual Review was supplemented by a third stage, which 
involved a systematic search of ASH’s website following through the menu options and links within their 
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webpage, in order to capture any documents or resources not identified in the previous search stages. This 
three-stage data gathering process provided us with a degree of confidence that we had gathered a 
sufficient number of reports for our research purposes.  
 
Having identified 416 documents that were published over an 11-year period (1999-2010), we identified 
which of these could be considered to be external accounts or containing descriptions of ASH’s wider 
activism in this period. To distinguish between activist and external accounting practices, we defined 
external accounting as the production of a documentary account typically based on research and evidence 
from medical science or other forms of expert disciplinary investigations (see section 4 for an overview of 
ASH’s use of expert disciplines). In contrast, activism was defined as material referring to a range of different 
activities, including engagements and participation in formal reviews of policy or legislation by governments, 
media stunts, protests and other forms of direct action. We downloaded and undertook a preliminary review 
and analysis of these documents between January and April 2011. This was followed by a further analysis 
undertaken between January and March 2013 and January and February 20148. This enabled us explore in 
more detail the interrelationship between external accounting, tactical intentions and states of conflict in 
specific conflict arenas with reference to those documents identified as external accounts.  
 
The analytical process was undertaken in four steps. First, we examined the documents in order to identify 
(i) the issue that was problematised; (ii) the descriptions of activist or external accounting practices; (iii) 
description of campaigns and conflict arenas; (iv) transformations that were claimed to result from their 
activism; and (v) the evidence base of the external account. Second, we thematically coded ASH’s Annual 
Reviews with reference to academic and policy literature pertaining to social movements and tobacco 
control in order to identify ASH’s objectives and intentions of, actors that were the target of their activism 
and arena actors with whom they engaged. Third, we analysed ASH’s usage of external accounts across 
different conflict states, and examined the extent to which the tactical intentions were considered to be 
confrontational, counter-action or co-operative. A final, more detailed, level of analysis was undertaken on 
three campaigns: ‘Big Tobacco’; smoke-free places; and Reduced Ignition Properties of cigarettes; in order to 
provide evidence of the engagement dynamics in specific conflict arenas. However, due to space constraints 
we only report here on one of these conflict arenas.  
 
We recognise that this case study is based solely on our analysis of the archive of documents and other 
materials gathered from on the ASH website. There is a potential lack of balance in this study arising from 
our concentration on the material produced by ASH and publicly available on their websites. We analysed 
only ASH’s self-reported actions and motivations, rather than drawing on primary data collected from a 
range of key actors. Thus, we cannot claim that this is a definitive statement of how external accounts were 
used or received in any specific engagement in a specific conflict arena. However, it was possible to confirm 
many of ASH’s claims with reference to material from other organisations (such the UN) and external 
sources of changes in organisational practices, laws, regulations, charters and international agreements. This 
lack of balance and difficulty in generalising our findings is a common limitation associated with case studies, 
but given our intention is to provide an overview of the scope of practices and engagement patterns over a 
long time period, we argue that this research design is appropriate.  
 
Our research design is intentionally designed to provide an empirical overview, drawing on documentary 
resources, into the scope and assemblages of campaigning practices deployed across a range of different 
tobacco-related conflict arenas. We acknowledge that further research will be needed to fully explore this 
complex topic. We suggest that the conceptual framework developed in this paper and the empirical study 
will be useful in framing and informing future research projects into activism and external accounting. In the 
following two sections we present findings concerning, first, the range, scope and patterns of usage of 
external accounting and activist practices; and second, the dynamics of the ‘Big Tobacco’ conflict arena.  
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4. ASH, arenas, accounting & activism 
 
This section reports on the range, scope and patterns of usage of external accounting and activist practices. 
Our investigation uncovered a number of different types of external accounts that were used in different 
conflict arenas and that were part of the assemblage of practices associated with ASH’s long-term campaign 
over tobacco control. We also identified a range of different activist practices used in the same period. Table 
4 provides a brief description of these activism and external accounting practices. 
 
Table 4: Categories of Activist and External Accounting Practices used by ASH 1999-2010 
 
ASH’s campaigns of activism were centred around information provision and networking in order to promote 
a wider public awareness about the ‘tobacco epidemic’, to press for policy measures at all relevant levels of 
governance (international, national, local and individual) and to reduce the burden of addiction, disease and 
premature death attributable to tobacco on individuals. To generate this pressure, ASH sought to mobilise a 
wide range of potential sources of influence and leverage.  For example, they made use of public opinion, 
moral outrage, customer pressure, investor pressure, coalitions with other activist groups, coalitions with 
medical and other professional institutions, existing voluntary codes, existing regulations, sub-political 
processes, local, national and international democratic/political processes and mass-media amplification. 
Our analysis suggests that ASH’s strategy was to exploit all opportunities to mitigate the harm of tobacco 
and that external accounting was an important tactical instrument within this strategy. To this end, ASH 
provided tailored external accounts of harm and solution possibilities, to support their specific campaigning 
activities and the actions of others. 
 
ASH’s activist and external accounting practices were underpinned by a systematic approach to investigating 
the harmful consequences of tobacco in society, which incorporated a range of scientific disciplines, 
research methods and data sources. ASH’s collective accounting for the risks and harms of tobacco drew on 
a very wide range of disciplines, including epidemiology, environmental science, macro-economics, 
chemistry, toxicology, marketing, accounting, health economics, legal studies, psychiatry, medical science, 
biochemistry, cultural studies, agriculture, forestry, risk and behavioural studies. These different disciplines 
and research methods were applied to a range of different perceived harms and risks across the life cycle of 
tobacco products, as listed in Table 5 below. ASH’s claims to adopt an evidence-based approach, based upon 
up-to-date published research or the commissioning, publishing and promoting of their own research into 
the harmful consequences of tobacco, were largely confirmed by our analysis. However, we also recognise 
the contested nature of all conventional scientific studies and the inability of contemporary science to 
produce certainty and irrefutable proof as to the risks and harms of a complex subject of enquiry such as the 
consequences of tobacco consumption and production (Beck, 1992; Wynne, 1996).  
 
Table 5 presents a variety of issues and impacts identified during our analysis of ASH’s activism and external 
accounts and illustrated the multiple and overlapping conflicts that ASH associated with tobacco. Associated 
with these different conflict arenas, we observed a range of accounting entities categories used by ASH to 
problematise ‘tobacco’, including: specific aspects of a product; diseases; supranational institutions; and the 
planet. Taken together, they may be viewed as a holistic depiction of the key risk and harms associated with 
tobacco governance, production, distribution and consumption. 
 
Table 5: ASH’s Conflict arenas 1999 – 2010 
 
ASH’s engagements were clearly linked to its vision of a world free from the negative consequences of 
tobacco, and were underpinned by a consistent discourse of harm intended to de-legitimate smoking and 
tobacco. This recurring discourse of harm could be seen in almost all of their activism, and appeared to be an 
attempt to reframe other programmatic discourses surrounding the acceptability of tobacco consumption 
and to radically transform the governing regimes associated with tobacco. ASH’s discourses of harm 
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associated with smoking and tobacco were wide ranging. Those featured in ASH’s documentation included 
those affecting the individual (including diseases such as child asthma and peripheral circulatory disease) as 
well as those that may affect entire countries, particularly those growing tobacco (ASH, 2008).  
 
Table 6 below attempts to map out the different assemblages of external accounting and activism used by 
ASH. In this period, ASH was demonstrably active across three types of external accounting: systematic, 
partisan, and contra-governing. Our analysis suggests that these external accounts were mainly used to 
confront and counter-act those actors in the arena considered to be problematic and to engender support 
and co-operation from other actors within the arena (or from other related arenas). We did notice that in 
conflict resolution states, there were assemblages of activism where external accounting was largely absent. 
Nor did we find any examples that met our criteria of dialogic external accounting.  However, certain types 
of external accounting and activism (including social harm reports, economic reports, social audits, 
participation and media amplification) could be seen to have greater general applicability across different 
conflict states, different types of tactical intentions and different levels of change. Other types of external 
accounting and activism could be more seen to be more specific in their deployment (including breach 
reports and other systematic accounts, lobbying, partisan and contra-governing accounts). 
 
Table 6:  Mapping assemblages of ASH external accounting & activism 
 
The complexity of the underlying topology of conflict arenas makes it difficult to determine any general 
assemblages, but the evidence in Table 6 below indicates that the specific activism and external accounting 
practices identified in Table 2 could be associated with different levels of change, conflict states and tactical 
intentions. We were able to identify some patterns in their activism assemblages, although these 
assemblages were tailored to each engagement in the different conflict arenas and were shaped by their 
strategic intentions and desired outcome related to the specific problem they were trying to address. There 
appeared to be different combinations of external accounts and activism practices in relation to conflict 
resolution and the other states in conflict arenas (initiation, perpetuation and escalation).  
 
ASH made use of a variety of more systematic methods, including existing laws and regulations, to seek to 
ensure that the tobacco industry behaved lawfully. They also sought to enforce voluntary codes and charters 
to reduce harm and attempted to persuade the tobacco industry to voluntarily change their practices, 
making use of investor pressure and other elements of the tobacco supply chain. They used educative 
processes to reduce the demand for smokers by supplying them more information on the consequences of 
smoking, controlling advertising and to develop measures for people to stop smoking. ASH were also 
observed to use combinations of assemblages of systematic external accounts with more confrontational 
activism. For example, their report entitled BAT’s African Footprint documents the impact of BAT’s 
production of tobacco in Africa (ASH, 2008) and was also accompanied with a campaign video, a Facebook 
campaign page, press releases and photographs of their direct lobbying at BAT’s AGM9 .  
 
In addition to these broadly systematic forms of activism, we also observed more explicit partisan and 
contra-governing activism. ASH were actively involved in the reform of different voluntary codes, regulations 
and laws in order to reduce tobacco consumption and harm. These included laws on taxations to make 
tobacco more expensive. When these reforms did not achieve their vision, ASH appeared happy to move to 
more confrontational strategies of conflict escalation, challenging the legitimacy of existing forms of 
governing tobacco in order to bring about desired changes. This involved moving amongst local arenas, 
national arenas and international arenas to put pressure on political institutions in order to achieve their 
desired outcomes. ASH also engaged with international governing institutions to radically challenge national 
governing regimes using the powers of these supranational institutions (including the United Nations and 
the World Health Organisation) to force changes in in local and global tobacco governance regimes.   
 
The changing nature of ASH’s external accounting suggests that greater attention should be given to the 
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alignment of such accounts with the governance regime associated with different forms of conflict. There 
appears to be an alignment between external accounting practices, governance regimes and power 
dynamics of those involved in conflict arenas. In some cases, ASH appears to have purposively changed in 
order to engage more effectively in these arenas. 
 
It would be wrong to conclude that ASH’s external accounts and activist practices were dominated only by 
confrontation and counter-action. As Table 6 indicates, ASH made extensive use of co-operative 
engagements seeking where possible to form coalitions and alliances with any actors where there was some 
level of common purpose. These co-operative tactics appeared to represent an valuable way of combatting 
inequalities of power and resources in the arena. Key elements of these co-operative tactics included their 
reputation as an effective activist organisation, ASH’s accounts of the changes they had influenced, trust in 
their evidence-based activism, the scientific and political legitimacy of their evidence base and the provision 
of legitimated solutions. ASH accumulated expertise in conflict engagements, as well as a large body of 
evidence of the risks and harms associated with tobacco that could be deployed in many different arenas.  
 
Given the quantity of conflict arenas that ASH were active in, and the broad assemblage of activist practices 
(including external accounts), is not possible in a single paper to provide a more comprehensive in-depth 
analysis of the complex interaction and engagement dynamics of each arena. Instead, we selected one arena 
that we believe provides insights into the complex interplay amongst actors and their use of different activist 
tactics and accounting practices. The next section presents our analysis of ASH’s use of external accounting 
in the conflict arena associated with contesting BAT’s claims to be a socially responsible and sustainable 
corporation. This arena was chosen, from all the arenas, for four main reasons. Firstly, it exhibited persistent 
and high profile use of a range of external accounting practices. Secondly, a key characteristic of this arena 
was the problematisation of social reporting as an effective form of corporate accountability. Thirdly, 
considerable use was made of external accounts to establish links with many different arenas. Fourthly, clear 
linkages were found between these external accounts and other forms of activism.  
 
 
5. Confronting the Social Responsibility Claims of BAT 
 
‘I think I am on the side of angels. I’m running a business which sells risky products and I see myself making a 
contribution to running that in a responsible way.’   
Paul Adams, Chief Executive of BAT10 (source: ASH, 2007, p.4) 
 
‘ASH, Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth have called on the UK government to ensure BAT’s reporting 
rhetoric is more closely aligned to its true impacts and that new international standards for tobacco control 
are met. Alongside the regulation of tobacco use itself, ASH and others have argued that BAT must also be 
held accountable by the UK government for its failure to protect the health and safety of its contract farmers 
and for the destruction of forests and farming land in developing countries in the name of tobacco.’  
(ASH, 2004 p. 4). 
 
ASH’s use of external accounts in assemblages of activist practices is perhaps best exemplified in the 
(unresolved) conflict arena concerned with the social responsibility of BAT. During the period of our analysis 
ASH published nine external accounts (ASH, 2002a,b, et seq.) that targeted BAT’s own social and 
environmental disclosures (BAT, 2002 et seq.). ASH also undertook other forms of activism against BAT 
during this period. It targeted BAT annual general meetings as an important protest site, and each year 
applied a different assemblage of activist practices intended to disrupt BAT’s official accounts and 
governance practices. Typically, these direct actions were associated with the campaign focus of their 
external account of BAT. For example, in 2006 ASH’s external account focussed on BAT’s marketing 
strategies in the developing world and their protest at the AGM co-opted BAT’s ‘buzz’ marketing strategies11 
to illustrate the harm of tobacco sales to young people (see also our description of ASH’s African Eco-
16 
 
footprint protest at BAT’s AGM). ASH’s external accounts of BAT’s CSR were linked to most of ASH’s tobacco 
related conflict arenas (see Table 7 below) and drew on all of the external accounting practices identified in 
Table 2.  Our analysis of this conflict explores how ASH problematised the CSR claims and conduct of BAT, 
and how this was linked to other arenas such as government policy, taxation, corruption, environmentalism, 
poverty, and international development.  We highlight the use of external accounts in relation to patterns of 
engagement that unfolded in this arena as part of ASH’s overarching campaign to counter what they refer to 
as the tobacco epidemic.     
 
Whilst it is difficult to objectively determine the initiation of any specific conflict (Renn, 1992; Beck, 1992; 
Beck and Willms, 2004; Power, 2004) we identified the publication by BAT of their Social Report in 2002 as 
an event that had a major disruptive force in a series of long-running conflicts over the social acceptability 
and legitimacy of corporations making profits from tobacco. It is possible to point to a number of events that 
could also be conflict initiator, but our analysis of this arena starts with an exchange of accounts on the 
subject of the social responsibility of BAT12.  
   
Table 7: Summary of ASH External Accounts in ASH-BAT CSR Conflict Arena 
 
Rather than repairing its legitimacy, BAT’s first CSR report (BAT, 2002) triggered a series of de-legitimating 
accounts and actions. These are summarised in Table 8, which also provides an analysis of the exchanges of 
accounts. During these exchanges, BAT denied claims of social and environmental irresponsibility and 
perpetuated the conflict, while ASH’s responses attempted to evidence BAT’s irresponsibility in order to 
reform BAT’s actions and the tobacco governance regime. It is important to recognise that this conflict arena 
is part of ASH’s wider campaign, and that their conflict with BAT is important strategically for the other 
conflict arenas. ‘Victory’ in the conflict over BAT’s social and environmental responsibility would be a 
powerful symbolic weapon in other arenas. Indeed, in this regard we should note that it proved difficult to 
disentangle the relevant engagements involved in our analysis of the BAT social responsibility arena, due to 
the many interconnections with ASH’s other conflict arenas (see Table 9  below for an overview of the links 
between BAT-CSR and other arenas).  
 
Our analysis of this arena demonstrates the use of diverse external account practices across different arena 
states (with the noticeable exception of resolution) associated with multiple tactical intentions and desired 
outcomes.  External accounts were used to deny, perpetuate and escalate the conflict, to confront, counter-
act and co-operate in order to achieve systematic, partisan and contra-governmental reforms. Some of these 
accounts were co-authored with other activist organisations (e.g. Friends of the Earth, Cancer Research UK 
and Christian Aid) and used evidence from NGOs, media reporting, scientific publications, local and national 
governments and international political institutions. We will present our analysis of this conflict arena, first 
with reference to the content of ASH reports (ASH, 2002a,b, 203, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010), second by 
examining the engagement patterns using our dynamic conflict arena framework and third with an 
evaluation of the nature of the conflict arena exchanges.  
 
Content of ASH’s BAT-CSR arena external accounts (2002-2010) 
All these external accounts were composite accounts, containing elements of the different external 
accounting practices outlined in Table 2, and underpinned by a discourse of harm related to BAT’s social and 
environmental irresponsible actions and intentions. The exact nature of the harm related to the entity of the 
external account, which targeted different aspects of BAT’s (ir)responsibility, as summarised in Table 7. 
 
Each of these accounts used evidence from a wide range of different sources, including peer reviewed 
journals, scientific reports, documents from legal cases, opinion polls, media reports, government reports, 
regulators, NGOs, other ASH reports and direct testimony. There was a multi-disciplinary evidential base to 
these accounts targeted to achieve specific tactical and strategic outcomes. These accounts also contained 
references to earlier accounts, building on previous accounts to collectively provide an emergent account of 
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the social (ir)responsibility of BAT.  
 
Whilst each account did appear to have a dominant objective, they all contained elements of (and were 
potentially able to contribute to) other conflicts. Table 8 maps the content of ASH BAT CSR accounts (2002-
2010) across ASH’s conflict arenas (see Table 2) and illustrates the level of interconnection with other 
arenas, stability over time of AHS’s discourse of harm, the scope of ASH’s critique of BAT social responsibility 
claims and the evidence base supporting ASH’s engagement with BAT. 
 
Table 8: Conflict Arena Coverage in ASH’s External Accounts (2002-2010 
 
We identified two significant and related themes from ASH’s external accounting. Firstly, these accounts all 
contained examples of BAT’s breaching international treaties, national laws, regional laws, voluntary codes 
of practices, engagement protocols and socially acceptable norms of behaviour. Secondly, these accounts 
contained evidence in support of strengthening the global framework of tobacco regulations and the 
policing of existing/new governance regimes. These two themes could be related to the dominant theme in 
BAT’s social and sustainability reports, which were social responsibility through compliance with an overly 
restrictive global regulatory regime. ASH and BAT’s engagement through the exchange of accounts could be 
seen to co-evolve reflexively responding cumulatively to the perceived impact (success or failure) of previous 
engagements and reacting to developments in other connected arenas. We will now provide details of our 
analysis of the conflict arena states, tactical intentions and external accounts involved in these exchanges. 
 
ASH External Accounts, Conflict States, Tactical Intentions and Strategic Intentions (2002 – 2010) 
Table 9 provides representation of our analysis of the account-related engagements in this unresolved 
conflict arena. We note that BAT’s approach remained relatively consistent over this period. Their 
engagements involved denying ASH’s discourse of social irresponsibility, providing evidence to support their 
socially responsibility, perpetuating the conflict and challenging the legitimacy of groups such as ASH to 
infringe on personal and corporate freedoms.  
 
Table 9: Exchanges of Accounts in the ASH-BAT CSR Conflict Arena (2002 - 2010) 
 
There was an element of escalation in 2007 when BAT shifted from producing an annual Social Report to a 
Sustainability Report, thus extending the scope of their claims to incorporate environmental as well as social 
responsibility. However, environmental impacts had formed part of their previous Social Reporting. BAT’s 
tactical intentions could be seen as confronting and counter-acting ASH’s (and other activists) claims as to 
BAT’s negative social and environmental impacts based on an underlying discourse of compliance with all 
laws and codes of practice, seeking co-operation with rule enforcers, political institutions and other 
stakeholders including investors and confronting the legitimacy of ASH to make these claims. 
 
BAT’s asserted claims to social and environmental accountability received a degree of professional 
legitimation in 2003 from the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), which presented BAT 
with an award for the best first-time social report, and further commended the company a year later for the 
use of electronic communications to support its social reporting. BAT were also included in the Dow Jones 
and Standards & Poors Sustainability Indices, which BAT presented as further independent validation of their 
social responsibility. However, ASH argued that the failure of these awards and listings to reflect the nature 
of BAT’s core business fundamentally undermined these legitimacy claims, and to support this argument it 
offered its own evidence of major omissions in BAT’s reports in relation to significant negative impacts of 
actions (ASH, 2004). In later accounts, ASH also directly challenged the legitimacy of organisations including 
the ‘Big 4’ accountancy firms, ACCA, Dow Jones and Standards & Poors to provide credible assurance of BAT 
or any other corporation’s social legitimacy. This pattern of re-legitimating and de-legitimating claims 
typifies the engagements in the conflict escalation state within this conflict arena. 
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As mentioned earlier, we start our analysis with BAT’s inaugural social report (2002) and ASH’s initial 
external accounting counter-action (ASH 2002a, 2002b). ASH’s external accounts challenged the 
completeness and accuracy of BAT’s account by producing a largely systematic alternative account (and a 
commentary) that shadowed the format of BAT’s 2002 report, which was claimed to comply with AA1000 
and GRI guidelines. The ASH account also criticised the scope of BAT’s report, providing detailed evidence of 
incomplete or missing disclosures, questioning the transparency of the report, and concluding that BAT had 
failed to provide reliable and relevant information to stakeholders. ASH (2002a, b) also criticised the 
company’s so-called ‘stakeholder dialogue’ process, an engagement to which ASH had been invited but 
chose to ignore, on the grounds that there were virtually no areas where BAT and ASH could find common 
cause (ASH, 2002b). This was a common message in all subsequent accounts, and helped to confirm our 
finding that there was a clear absence of dialogic external accounting or engagements between BAT and 
ASH. 
 
ASH’s assessment of BAT’s 2002 social report was grounded in the same language of accounting and auditing 
as adopted in the BAT report. The use of quantitative, expert techniques was thus also implicitly 
acknowledged: the only difference was in the scope of the accounts, where ASH assembled greater objective 
‘measures’ of the harm caused by the sale of BAT’s products. In ASH (2002a,b) BAT’s behaviour was 
problematised in terms that could be addressed by an increased commitment to voluntary accounting and 
auditing practices. ASH (2002a, b) may be characterised as monitoring or breach reports, in that they 
implicitly supported the current regime of governing and that the provision of additional evidence of non-
compliance by BAT would trigger corrective actions (and sanctions) from different actors in arena in 
accordance with the arena’s governance regime. From this perspective ASH (2002a,b) are examples of 
systematic external accounting, that works within existing regimes of governing by enhancing the visibility 
on non-compliant actions expressed in a form aligned with the dominant rationality of those currently in 
power. The extent of the transformation associated with this style of engagement may be limited in scope, 
but has the advantage of working with existing power and resource distribution structures. Whilst these 
accounts sought to confront BAT’s claims they could also be seen as trying to gain co-operation from other 
actors, including rule enforcers, in order to resolve what ASH perceived as BAT’s problematic actions.  
 
ASH (2003) may be seen as an attempt to perpetuate the conflict by providing new evidence into the arena 
in a more targeted fashion than ASH (2002a, b). This external account could also be characterised as a 
systematic breach account in that it provided examples of BAT’s irresponsible actions as part of an industry  
lobbying campaign against proposed UK legislation on a smoking ban in public places. This account 
presented evidence of what ASH considered to be problematic activities drawn from a range of different 
sources in order to confront BAT’s claim to be socially responsible. This account could also be seen to seek 
co-operation from other actors to counter-act BAT’s (and other organisations’) claims to be socially 
responsible. ASH (2003) shifted the focus from their earlier accounts (ASH, 2002a,b) away from social 
reporting practices, towards exposing the practices by which BAT and other organisations used to engage 
with government to shape or block proposed legislation. Problematic lobbying on the part of BAT had 
formed part of ASH (2002a,b) but ASH (2003) built on this content and provided more detailed examples of 
BAT’s lobbying activities. 
 
ASH (2004) consisted largely of a collection of systematic breach reports that perpetuated the conflict by 
providing new evidence of BAT’s actions. However, there were elements of conflict escalation and a more 
overtly partisan approach, particularly through a direct challenge to the effectiveness of UK corporate law 
and reporting regulations and support for company law reform. As this report was co-authored with 
Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth, it suggested that ASH had been successful in building coalitions of 
support for this specific conflict and was active in supporting actors in another arena, such as CORE’s 
campaign for corporate law reform13.  Existing forms of corporate governance and reporting were presented 
as inadequate to deal with BAT’s perceived irresponsible actions and described as legitimating illegitimate 
actions. Included in ASH (2004) were explicit critiques of members of the Labour Government, and a call to 
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the UK Government to: 
 
‘stop pretending that corporate responsibility can be achieved through voluntary agreements alone 
and to change the law so that UK companies must take account of social and environmental 
concerns……requiring all UK companies to report annually on the significant negative impact of their 
operations, policies, products and procurement practices on people and the environment both in the 
UK and abroad (in a manner by which it can be independently certified). This should include publication 
of independently conducted and verified studies on the global health impacts of BAT products. New 
legal duties on directors to take reasonable steps to reduce any significant negative social, health or 
environmental impacts. ’   
ASH (2004, p. 26) 
 
This more partisan form of external accounting continued with ASH (2005), which was similar in content to 
ASH (2002a,b) and provided a more comprehensive attempt to de-legitimate social responsibility claims 
(BAT, 2005). In this account (again published jointly with Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth), ASH adopt a 
form of immanent critique to re-present actual statements by BAT’s executives, in order to disprove the 
company’s own claims to be socially responsible. For example, they use extracts from BAT internal 
documents to highlight how BAT used social reporting as ”air cover from criticism while improvements are 
being made.” (ASH, 2005, p. 28) and conceal the damage caused to health, development and the 
environment. ASH (2005) was also more critical in tone than the previous external accounts, and focused on 
a range of actions that it claimed ‘proved’ BAT’s social irresponsibility. These included BAT’s attempts to 
block the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the discrediting of research from the World Health 
Organisation, and the use of self-regulation and coordinated corporate giving programmes to pre-empt 
higher taxes, tobacco advertising bans and restrictions on smoking in public places.  
 
ASH (2005) builds on the partisan nature and more confrontation style of ASH (2004) and marks a further 
shift away from the monitoring of voluntary management commitments (as evidenced in ASH 2002a,b), 
towards calls for stronger government intervention through radical reform of corporate governance and 
disclosure practices. This account was strongly critical of the government’s reform package with evidence of 
contra-governing objectives, including direct appeals for the need for state control on behalf of the wider 
population, to protect the population from the threat posed by BAT. ASH (2005) could be seen to 
problematise the neo-liberal approach to corporate governance, with calls for the government interventions 
that were more closely allied to biopower governmentality (Dean, 1999, 2007).  
 
This conflict escalation was again observed in ASH (2006), although this account focused rather more on how 
investors and UK government were benefiting from BAT’s global operations. It also confronted the UK 
corporate governance regime that legitimated these negative consequences to others, whilst at the same 
time considering BAT as compliant with laws and regulations. ASH (2006) is largely a collection of breach 
accounts that demonstrate the inadequacies of voluntary codes of conduct and regulations and presented 
new evidence of the risks and harms resulting from BAT’s actions, with a focus on the developing world. ASH 
(2006) collated evidence and direct testimony from a range of different sources and demonstrates support 
and co-operation from other actors acting together to counter-act BAT’s claims of social and environmental 
responsibility. This report can be seen as a partisan external account but which also builds on the elements 
of contra-governmentality contained in previous reports. 
 
ASH (2007) can be seen as perpetuating the conflict, but with no obvious escalation. It contains a collection 
of breach reports, which are both systematic and partisan in nature. This account is a focussed 
delegitimation of the impact of BAT’s youth marketing activities in the developing world. Similar to ASH 
(2003) this account confronts BAT’s claim to be socially responsible by providing evidence of a specific 
activity that ASH considered to be in breach of BAT’s own code of conduct and/or other codes of practice. 
Specifically, ASH (2007) calls for: 
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“all countries which have ratified the WHO’s global health treaty, the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, to protect their young people by implementing comprehensive advertising bans on 
tobacco products, as recommended by the treaty, with utmost urgency. We are also sending the UK 
Health Minister our evidence of how BAT is subverting the tobacco advertising ban and urging her to 
take action immediately to get rid of the loopholes in UK law”  
ASH (2007, p5.).  
 
Following a direct challenge by ASH at BAT's 2007 AGM to respond to the allegations contained in 
ASH (2007), BAT admitted that there were examples of practices that were in breach of their International 
Marketing Standards and that the company would launch an enquiry to investigate further.  
  
The practice of confronting BAT’s socially responsibility claims through a focussed examination of part of 
their actions is continued in ASH (2008). This account also demonstrates conflict escalation, involving 
detailed scrutiny of BAT’s African operations and challenging the company’s shift from social to sustainability 
reporting. There is also evidence of conflict perpetuation through the provision of new allegations and 
continued confrontation of corporate governance regimes.  ASH (2008) may be viewed as a largely partisan 
external account that seeks to create a more explicit link to other conflict arenas associated with claims of 
environmental damage caused in the developing world by multinational corporations.  
 
ASH’s 2010 external account of BAT (ASH, 2010) can be seen as a combination of systematic and partisan 
breach accounts, providing evidence of BAT’s problematic engagement in industry level lobbying 
engagements to shape health policy development and enactment. This account was historic in nature but 
also includes an element of conflict escalation, by exposing those institutions ASH identify as working with 
BAT and other firms but which pose as independent organisations. This could be seen as an attempt to draw 
other institutions into the conflict arena by confronting them as well as BAT. ASH (2010) is similar to ASH’s 
previous external accounts (2003, 2006, 2007, 2008) in that it does not comprehensively respond to BAT’s 
accounts but rather adopts a more selective and focussed approach. This is achieved by highlighting specific 
examples of practices ASH considers unacceptable and using these specific examples to de-legitimate 
broader sustainability and social responsibility claims by BAT. ASH (2010) contains a call to mobilise the 
general public in their campaign, in their press release for ASH (2010), the director of ASH asks: 
 
“members of the public to write to their MPs to urge them to uphold their obligations under the WHO's 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and not let cigarette firms and their lobbyists influence 
health policy.”14 
 
This sub-section has provided our analysis of the relationships between ASH’s external accounts, conflict 
arena states, tactical intentions and strategic objectives in the period 2002 – 2010. Figure 1 below illustrates 
the variety of actors engaged in the ASH-BAT CSR arena. While we focus primarily on the exchange of 
accounts between ASH and BAT, the conflict arena incorporates many other actors. The next section will 
provide our evaluation of engagements within this specific conflict arena. 
 
Figure 1: Actors involved in the ASH-BAT CSR conflict arena 
 
ASH – BAT Engagement Dynamics 
ASH’s engagements with BAT were clearly linked to its vision of a world free from the harm caused by 
tobacco and underpinned by its general discourse of harm intended to de-legitimate smoking and tobacco. 
BAT’s engagements with ASH were linked to its vision of a neo-liberal world where individuals were free 
manage their own risks, to make decisions as to what they consumed and where. BAT’s underlying discourse 
was one of compliance, compliance with laws, voluntary codes, regulatory frameworks and culturally 
acceptable actions and intentions. By demonstrating their compliance with what they perceived as a strict 
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regulatory regime they sought to demonstrate their legitimacy and problematise the tobacco protest lobby, 
of which ASH was a significant actor (cf. Georgakopoulos & Thomson, 2008). 
 
The engagements between ASH and BAT (and their respective shifting coalitions of supporters) can be 
characterised as a clash over different forms of governmentality (see also Oels, 2005; Dean, 1999; Russell & 
Thomson, 2009). ASH’s campaigning exhibited many of the attributes of biopower, through a desire to 
legitimate extended government interventions based on science in order to position tobacco as a “space 
under police supervision, expert management or technocratic control” (Luke, 1999, p.194).  Where the 
problems of tobacco extended beyond the control of a national government, ASH then acted contra-
governmentally, to develop transnational solutions involving internationally legitimate regulatory 
institutions and structures. ASH’s contra-governmentality was underpinned by the rational, technocratic 
management of individuals by experts familiar with the scientific risks and hazards of tobacco production 
and consumption. ASH sought to achieve their objectives through disciplinary mechanisms that prescribed 
normalised individual behaviour via education, voluntary codes of conduct, policing and surveillance. 
 
By contrast, BAT (in conjunction with others) actively resisted this attempt to establish a biopower regime 
where tobacco was even more restrictively policed by the state institutions, arguing that deregulation and 
allowing for greater individual choice was the most appropriate governance regime. In this regime, 
governments would empower the free market, and trust individuals to make the right decision for 
themselves. In BAT’s neo-liberal vision, institutional science and paternalistic ethics were less important in 
defining the problems (and solutions) associated with tobacco, a substance which in BAT’s view should be 
left to the individual consumer’s own ‘cost-benefit’ analysis.   
 
Two further insights may be made regarding engagement dynamics, both relating to the tactical use of 
rhetoric as methods of counter-action. Alongside techniques such as the ironic use of deconstruction 
(Spence, 2009; Kneip, 2013) and immanent critique (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003), which we identified in 
Table 3 earlier, we observed in this arena a recurring use of metonymy and synecdoche (Spence and 
Thomson, 2009). Metonymy was deployed as a means to use a specific element of a conflict (e.g. involving 
BAT) to epitomise and represent for the whole (e.g. ‘Big Tobacco’). Metonymy conflates the source and 
target domains and creates the possibility of wider change from a focussed intervention. It should also be 
noted that corporations often use this tactical device themselves in their own social reporting, for example 
by reporting on a few instances of socially responsible actions, and implying that the whole corporation is 
therefore socially responsible (Spence and Thomson, 2009). The use of metonymy in ASH’s external 
accounting was seen to be associated with conflict escalation, moving from a specific account or 
engagement relating to harm or risk, to the possibility of wider, systemic harm or risk.  
 
We also observed the use of synecdoche as way to link the source of evidence with a target domain. 
Synecdoche uses a representation or evidence of the whole to represent the part (Spence and Thomson, 
2009). For example, ASH used studies and analysis of the tobacco industry as a whole as representing any 
part of the tobacco industry. Therefore a study that identified tobacco smuggling or problematic marketing 
undertaken at an industry level could be deployed to critique the social irresponsibility of any specific 
tobacco related company. The combined use of metonymy and synecdoche allows external accounts to be 
deployed in a range of different conflict arenas, thus leveraging the potential power of any evidence or 
account within a range of different harm discourses, as means to link conflict arenas, or in conflict 
escalation. Given the range of external accounts and wider evidence ASH has gathered over time in so many 
different conflict arenas, this organisation is in a powerful position to deploy different accounts within 
different arenas, to assist them in achieving their desired outcomes in any tobacco related conflicts. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
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Within the social accounting literature, previous studies of external accounts have largely focussed on single 
conflict, two-actor arenas. As a consequence, these studies have arguably ignored the significance of 
engagements in past and parallel conflicts, including past resolutions and co-operations amongst all arena 
actors. In this paper, we have sought to address these limitations by developing a dynamic conflict arena 
framework with the potential to offer new insights in the exploration of the complex interactions 
surrounding the giving and receiving of external accounting by social activists, within the context of their 
assemblage of other social activist practices and inter-connected conflict arenas. More specifically, we have 
extended the theoretical understanding of external accounting by integrating prior research and typologies 
of external accounting (Dey et al., 2012) with research into conflict dynamics (Beck & Wilms, 2004) and 
activist intentions and practices (Kneip, 2013). Within our dynamic conflict arena framework, it is possible 
for all arena participants to engage (or not engage) in all states of a conflict, have a range of different tactical 
intentions, use a range of engagement practices, use different forms of external accounts and seek different 
outcomes. Our conceptual model is not proposed as a normative model to develop ideal forms of external 
accounting, but as a heuristic to make sense of external accounting practices as part of social transformation 
processes. 
 
We drew on this conceptual model to undertake a longitudinal analysis of the activities of one social activist 
organisation (ASH) involved in a persistent, long term struggle against a range of different, often more 
powerful antagonists, within a number of separate, but related conflict arenas surrounding tobacco 
production and consumption. Between 1999 and 2010, the sustained activist campaign undertaken by ASH 
may be regarded as being influential in bringing about significant transformation of what ASH considered to 
be undesirable activities. This transformation is perhaps especially worthy of note given the power and size 
of their opponents collectively described as ‘Big Tobacco’.  
 
Our analysis illustrated how ASH’s use of external accounts played a significant part in a series of inter-
related campaigns. During the period of analysis, we identified a variety of systematic, partisan and contra-
governing external accounts produced by ASH, that produced new knowledge and new visibilities of the 
undesirable social, economic and environmental consequences of tobacco production and consumption. 
ASH addressed a wide range of harms in relation to various accounting entities. Their external accounts 
delegitimised and de-normalised the institutionalised identities of multinational corporations, products, 
supply chains, regulators, individuals, employers, politicians and government institutions. External accounts 
were part of campaigns intended to enable the more effective implementation of existing governing 
technologies, reform certain technologies of government, and challenge the rationality underpinning 
systems of governing.  
 
Individual accounts produced by ASH were also used to construct a holistic multi-dimensional problematising 
account of tobacco in the broadest sense. Whilst there were differences in the accounting entity, content, 
media, knowledge promoted, visibilities created, transformations sought and activist tactics, ASH’s accounts 
consistently challenged the rights of individual smokers (consumers), companies and ‘the market’ to be 
privileged over the rights of wider society.  Taken as a whole, these external accounts exposed a 
comprehensive set of socially unacceptable consequences of tobacco production, consumption and 
governance, but they also contained governing solutions and accounts of better ways of being.   
 
Our analysis of ASH’s external accounting, and the significant extent of its use by the organisation, suggests 
that ASH regards social accounting as powerful problematising technology. We suggest that this technology 
can be understood and incorporated into many different governing rationalities and discourses, particularly 
in those institutions with the powers and resources to impede, promote or enact their desired change. We 
consider ASH as an example of an organisation that is aware that institutional conduct is multidimensional, 
and that changing conduct requires holistic problematisation and attempting to achieve transformative 
change along a number of trajectories. Despite ASH’s stated sense of urgency in dealing with what they 
identify to be the social, economic and ecological harm associated with tobacco, there is a recognition of 
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working within different (but connected) arenas, and that the radical changes they seek will emerge from a 
long-term reform process rather than from a single external account.   
 
ASH’s external accounting and activism seeks transformation through changes to policy and to culture 
(Berridge, 2007, p. 1312). We suggest that ASH's use of external accounting provides evidence of the 
transformative potential of external accounting when combined with a comprehensive activist strategy, 
even when pitted against powerful multi-national corporations which had strong incentives to resist any 
such redistribution of power or changes in governance (Bebbington and Thomson, 2007). There is a need to 
further explore the use of external accounting in other contested arenas, prior to any generalisations 
concerning the more universal efficacy of external accounting. It may be argued that ASH did not operate in 
a genuinely democratic and emancipatory fashion, but sought instead to impose its values upon others. 
However, a similar argument can be made against ‘Big Tobacco’ and the organisations funded by the 
tobacco industry, an argument that is arguably compounded by the industry’s financial self-interest. By 
contrast, the social and economic benefits obtaining from ASH’s campaigning are arguably much larger and 
more widely distributed.  
 
Given the embeddedness and diversity of their external accounting practices within other activist practices, 
we recognise that it is difficult to disentangle the specific impact of individual external accounts and provide 
a more comprehensive in-depth analysis of the complex interaction and engagement dynamics of each 
arena. The acknowledged limitations of the research method adopted mean that it is difficult to come to any 
more general conclusions from this overview of practices, other than to illustrate the complex nature of 
activism (even when viewed from a single issue activist group), the diversity of possible assemblages of 
activist practices and the flexibility of different external accounts or activism to be deployed for different 
purposes at different states of a conflict arena and different desired outcomes. Further research into 
external accounting will in our view require investigation of a number of key dimensions, including: the 
oppressed groups who the account is prepared on behalf of; the nature of the social accounting entity; 
articulation of the problematic conduct and transformation sought; the robustness of the external 
accountant’s claim to represent the oppressed groups; the appropriateness of the external account’s 
content; the media and accounting methods used. In particular, any attempt to evaluate the 
transformational effectiveness of an external account has to be located within its specific contested arena, 
engagement dynamics and tactics.  
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Endnotes  
1 In the academic literature, external accounts have been referred to using many different terms, including: social 
audits (Medawar, 1976), anti-reports (Ridgers, 1979), deindustrialisation or plant closure audits (Harte and Owen, 
1987), silent accounts (Gray, 1997), shadow accounts (Dey, 2007), heteroglossic accounts (Macintosh and Baker, 2002), 
reporting-performance portrayal gaps (Adams, 2004), social accounts (Cooper et al., 2005), dialogic accounts 
(Bebbington et al., 2007), counter accounts (Gallhofer et al., 2006), anti-accounts (Spence, 2009), polylogic accounts 
(Brown and Dillard, 2013) and new accounts (Gray et al., forthcoming). Following Dey et al. (2012), we use the term 
‘external accounts’ as an umbrella term, within which a more specific typology of different approaches may be 
identified. 
2 Specific examples and relevant academic studies exemplifying each of the four main types of external accounts are 
identified and discussed in detail by Dey et al. (2012). 
3 In 2011 and 2012, ASH won awards from the World Health Organisation and American Cancer Institute for its 
campaigning in recognition of their efforts in establishing the UN Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the 
development of the illicit tobacco trade protocol. (http://www.ash.org.uk/about-ash, accessed March, 2014.) 
4 http://www.ash.org.uk/about-ash (Accessed 13 Feb 2013). 
5 Interview with Mike Daube. Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine, William Norman 
collection, ASH archive, SA/ASH R.12, Box 77, c.1975-6 (Berridge, 2007). 
6 Annual reviews were not available for 2000 and 2002. 
7 We used the terms and phrases from the Annual Reviews to search the ASH website, using their embedded search 
facility and ASH’s pathfinder function designed to guide users to particular tobacco control information on their 
website and key external sources and websites. 
8 This secondary analysis was undertaken in response to a number of extremely useful comments from two anonymous 
reviewers of the first draft of this paper. 
9 See http://www.ash.org.uk/information/tobacco-industry/bats-african-footprint for further details). 
10 Source: ‘Plotting a course in an industry where angels fear to tread’, Times, January 15, 2007. 
11 Buzz marketing is a form of viral marketing based on a series of choreographed one-on-one conversations designed 
to promote a product via a word-of-mouth campaign using an ‘elite peer’ group to talk up the product normally in the 
setting where it is consumed.   
12 As an aside, it is interesting to note that this conflict was initiated by a voluntary corporate report intended to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of a company in the face of a range of de-legitimating pressures.  
13 CORE was formed in 1998 in response to consultations on government plans to review company law in 1998. 
Members of CORE included New Economics Foundation, Traidcraft, Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, WWF-UK, The Co-operative Bank and World Development Movement. 
14 Source: http://www.ash.org.uk/media-room/press-releases/the-smoke-filled-room-how-big-tobacco-influences-
health-policy-in-the-uk . 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Arena Actors: 
(Renn, 1992) 
• Political Institutions 
• Rule Enforcers 
• Issue Amplifiers 
• Supportive Activists / Stakeholders 
• Problematising Activists / Stakeholders 
• General Public 
 
States of a Conflict: 
(Beck & Wilms, 2004) 
• Initiation 
• Denial 
• Perpetuation 
• Escalation 
• Resolution 
 
Actors’ Tactical Intentions: 
(Kneip, 2013) 
• Confrontation 
• Counter-action 
• Co-operation 
 
External Accounts and Activist practices: 
(Dey et al., 2012) 
• Systematic 
• Partisan 
• Contra-governing 
• Dialogic 
 
Table 1: Summary of key dimensions within conflict arenas 
 
 
Type of 
External 
Account 
Visibility 
created 
Entity to 
transform 
Transformation 
sought 
Systematic Systematic new evidence 
or knowledge on target 
organisation’s conduct or 
intentions 
 
Specific organisational conduct  Participation and/or reform within 
existing governing & accountability 
processes 
Partisan  Selective new evidence or 
narrative on inadequacies 
or loopholes of governing 
Specific governing technology, 
organisation or regime 
De-legitimation of specific 
government technology, institution 
or field within overall governing 
regime 
 
Contra-
governing 
Counter-expert evidence 
on underlying nature or 
ideology of governing 
system 
 
Regime of government De-legitimation of existing 
governing system  
 
Dialogic Multiple perspectives 
within a governing 
technology or organisation 
 
Oppressed and silenced voices 
within existing technology, 
organisation or regime 
 
Dialogic engagement towards a 
new form of emancipatory 
governing 
Table 2: A typology of external accounting (adapted from Dey et al., 2012) 
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External account  
(Dey et al., 2012) 
Tactical Intention (Kneip, 2013) 
Confrontation Counter-action Co-operation 
Systematic   Systematic monitoring or 
breach reporting against 
specific elements of governing 
conduct 
Participation within organisation-level 
stakeholder dialogues or ‘polyvocal’ 
accounts; 
Participation within voluntary field-
level coalitions and practices 
 
Partisan  Organisation or field-
level evidence of harm 
and dramatizing 
narratives  
 
Ironic deconstruction; 
 
Immanent critique  
Contributing evidence as part of field-
level reform of policy making and 
regulation 
Contra-governing  Proposed replacement 
‘utopian’ forms of 
governance  
Regime-level deconstruction 
or critique using expert 
science and evidence  
 
 
Dialogic    Participation in dialogic process of 
engagement or independent 
mediation, typically at organisation or 
issue level 
 
Table 3: Mapping types of external accounts to activist tactical intentions 
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Activism External Accounting 
Participation: formal involvement with existing 
governance processes and practices related to 
tobacco. 
Education: development/ delivery of tobacco related 
knowledge, including speaking at conferences and 
other symposiums 
Guides/Toolkits: the preparation and dissemination of 
guides/toolkits on how to minimise the harm 
caused by tobacco related activities 
Charters: the establishment, promotion and monitoring 
of voluntary charters and organisational 
commitments to reduce the harm caused by 
tobacco related activities 
Adverts: use of marketing media to disseminate the harm 
caused by tobacco related activities  
Protests: participation and organisation of public 
demonstrations to reduce the harm caused by 
tobacco related activities  
Media Stunts: high profile, media-friendly stunts designed 
to draw action to specific harm caused by tobacco 
related activities 
Lobbying: political lobbying at all levels (local Authorities, 
trade associations, national governments, supra-
national organisations, e.g. EU, UN, GATT) in 
support of measures to reduce the harm caused 
by tobacco related activities 
Media Amplification: providing media friendly versions of 
their technical, scientific, economic accounts / 
reports  
Scientific Research: reviewing existing research 
publications, commissioning their own research 
studies and publishing in peer-reviewed journals. 
Breach Reports: reports that identified non-
compliance with existing voluntary and 
statutory regulations 
Medical Reports: reports that links tobacco related 
activities with specific medical conditions 
Social Harm Reports: reports that link tobacco 
related activities with evidence of harm to 
members of society 
Economic Reports: reports of the external costs of 
tobacco related activities, normally related to 
industry claims of the economic benefit of the 
tobacco trade 
Opinion Polls and Surveys: reports of public opinion 
in relation to the social acceptability of tobacco 
related activities and policy measures to 
change tobacco related activities  
Social Audit: external accounts of social and 
environmental accounts produced by specific 
corporations. 
Eco-footprinting: report using eco-footprinting 
methods to identify the environmental impact 
of a particular activity 
Table 4: Categories of Activist and External Accounting Practices used by ASH 1999 - 2010 
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Business Life Cycle Arenas: 
Tobacco processing Tobacco smuggling Tobacco agriculture  Supply chain  
Child labour Environmental impact Deforestation Impact on developing countries 
Human rights Government policies Regulatory & voluntary codes  Law & code violations 
Corporate lobbying Corruption & bribery Price fixing Health & safety at work 
CSR activities Product marketing Art, sport & culture sponsorship  Social auditing & reporting 
Impact on Others: 
Smoking in public 
spaces Product consumption risks Preventable deaths Passive smoking 
Economic externalities Poverty  Funding of scientific research Taxation & tariffs 
Smoking at home Workplace smoking Product composition Health Policy  
Scientific legitimacy Smoking in cars Impact on business Fire risks 
Company law Youth smoking prevention  Anti-smoking programmes Unborn children 
Specific Medical Conflicts: 
Prostrate conditions Circulatory disease Cancer Tuberculosis 
Oral health Emphysema Asthma Surgery recovery 
Sexual dysfunction  Heart/ cardiac conditions Nicotine addiction  Mental health 
Diabetes Blood pressure Respiratory conditions Child health 
Table 5: ASH’s Conflict arenas 1999 – 2010 
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 Conflict Stage Activist Intention External account 
 Initiation Denial Perpetuation Escalation Resolution Confrontation Counter-
action 
Cooperation Systematic Partisan Contra-
governing 
Dialogic 
External 
Accounts: 
            
Breach Reports             
Eco-footprinting             
Opinion Polls 
and Surveys 
            
Social Harm 
Reports 
            
Medical Reports             
Social Audit             
Economic 
Reports 
            
Evidence / 
Consultations 
            
 
Activism: 
            
Media Stunts             
Protests             
Media 
Amplification 
            
Adverts             
Lobbying             
Scientific 
Research 
            
Education             
Participation             
Charters             
Guides/ Toolkits               
Table 6:  Mapping assemblages of ASH external accounting & activism 
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Report Title Main Entities 
ASH (2002a/b) BAT: The other report to society/ BAT social 
report revisited: ASH comes to BAT 
BAT Social Report 2002 & Social Reporting 
Processes  
ASH (2003) The tobacco industry, ETS and the hospitality 
industry  
Corporate lobbying on Proposed Legislation 
ASH (2004) Big Wheeze (with Christian Aid & Friends of 
the Earth) 
BAT’s CSR activities & UK Corporation Laws and 
reporting 
ASH (2005) BAT in its own words (with Christian Aid & 
Friends of the Earth) 
BAT’s CSR activities & UK Corporate 
Governance Regime 
ASH (2006) British American Tobacco: Exporting Misery 
 
Impact on developing countries  
ASH (2007) You’ve got to be kidding 
 
Impact on developing countries of marketing 
tactics 
ASH (2008) BAT’s African Footprint  
 
Social and environmental impact in Africa 
ASH (2010) The Smoke filled room: how big tobacco tries 
to influence UK health policy 
Corporate lobbying on Public Health 
Table 7: Summary of ASH External Accounts in ASH-BAT CSR Conflict Arena 
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Business Life 
Cycle Arenas 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 10 Impact on Others 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 10 
Medical 
Conflicts 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 10 
Govt policies  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Preventable deaths ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Child health ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Regulatory & 
voluntary code ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Product 
consumption ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Respiratory 
conditions  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  
Law & code 
violations ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Scientific 
legitimacy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Nicotine 
addiction ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Product 
marketing ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Youth smoking 
prevention ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Cancer ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ 
Developing 
countries ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Health policy  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cardiac 
conditions  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓    
Corporate 
lobbying ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Anti-smoking 
programmes ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Circulatory 
disease  ✓  ✓      
Human rights  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ Public spaces smoking ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ Emphysema   ✓  ✓    
CSR activities  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  Tax & tariffs  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ Asthma ✓        
Arts, sport, 
culture sponsor ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  Passive smoking ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓  Tuberculosis       ✓  
Corruption ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ Funding research  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ Sexual dysfunction          
Tobacco 
agriculture ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  
Workplace 
smoking ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Blood 
pressure          
Supply chain ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  Poverty ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  Surgery recovery         
Environment ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  Economic externalities ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ Diabetes         
Tobacco 
processing ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  Company law ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  Oral health         
Tobacco 
smuggling ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Product 
consumption ✓   ✓    ✓ 
Mental 
health         
Social reports ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  Smoking at home ✓   ✓              
Deforestation ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  Unborn children ✓ ✓                
Health & safety ✓ ✓ ✓      Business impact  ✓      ✓          
Price fixing ✓  ✓ ✓     Fire risks        ✓          
Child labour ✓  ✓    ✓  Smoking in cars                  
Table 8: Conflict Arena Coverage in ASH’s External Accounts (2002-2010) 
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BAT =  Conflict State Tactical Intention External Account No. of 
Arenas ASH =  Denial Perpetuation Escalation Confrontation Counteraction Co-operation Systematic Partisan Contra-governing 
2002      1     
      2    44 
2003           
          21 
2004           
          40 
2005           
          38 
2006           
          27 
2007           
          13 
2008           
          35 
2009           
          n/a 
2010           
          33 
Table 9: Exchanges of Accounts in the ASH-BAT CSR Conflict Arena (2002 - 2010) 
 
1 this does not denote an attempt to co-operate with ASH but indicates attempts to build alliances with political institutions, rule enforcers, other supportive stakeholders 
and the general public through media amplifiers. 
2 this does not denote an attempt to co-operate with BAT but indicates attempts to build alliances with political institutions, rule enforcers, other oppositional stakeholders 
and the general public through media amplifiers. 
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Figure 1: Actors involved in the ASH-BAT CSR conflict arena 
(source: Derived from analysis of ASH’s external accounts 2002-2010) 
 
 
 
